Williams (Michael) v. Taylor
120 S. Ct. 1479 (2000) by unknown
Capital Defense Journal
Volume 13 | Issue 1 Article 7
Fall 9-1-2000
Williams (Michael) v. Taylor 120 S. Ct. 1479
(2000)
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj
Part of the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons
This Casenote, U.S. Supreme Ct. is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Capital Defense Journal by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Williams (Michael) v. Taylor 120 S. Ct. 1479 (2000), 13 Cap. DEF J. 117 (2000).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj/vol13/iss1/7
Williams (Michael) v. Taylor
120 S. Ct. 1479 (2000)
L Facts
On February 23, 1993, Verena Lozano James ("James") drove Michael
Wayne Williams ("Williams") and Jeffrey Alan Cruse ("Cruse") to a rural
area of Cumberland County, Virginia. Armed with a .357 revolver, Wil-
liams and Cruse planned to rob a store in the area, but found that it was
closed. Williams and Cruse walked to the home of Morris Keller, Jr. and
his wife, Mary Elizabeth Keller. When Mr. Keller answered Cruse's knock,
Williams and Cruse forced their way into the house and searched the house
for valuables to steal. Williams and Cruse each raped Mrs. Keller. Williams
ordered the Kellers to shower and dress, and told them they were going to
"take a walk," and that he and Cruse were going to burn down the house.'
Williams and Cruse took the Kellers away from the house down a dirt
road. The two men agreed to shoot the Kellers on the count of three.
Williams shot Mr. Keller in the head, but Cruse did not shoot Mrs. Keller
at the same time. Williams told Cruse to shoot Mrs. Keller. Cruse fired one
shot into Mrs. Keller's head. Mr. Keller stood up and Williams shot him in
the head a second tinie. Williams shot each of the Kellers two or three
more times to be certain that they were dead
Williams and Cruse then returned to the Kellers' house, loaded the
stolen property into the Kellers' car, and set the house on fire. The two
men drove the car to Fredericksburg, Virginia and subsequently sold some
of the stolen property. They then threw the rest of the stolen items and the
.357 revolver into the Rappahannock River. Williams and Cruse ultimately
burned the stolen car.'
Police interviewed Cruse about the fire at the Kellers' home, but he
was not cooperative. When the Kellers' bodies were found Cruse conferred
with counsel, eventually obtaining a plea bargain. The Commonwealth
agreed to forgo seeking the death penalty in exchange for Cruse providing
them with complete information about the crimes. The Commonwealth
rescinded Cruse's plea agreement when it discovered that Cruse had omitted
the fact that he raped Mrs. Keller.4
1. Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1479, 1484 (2000).
2. Id. at 1484-85.




At his trial in January 1994, Williams was convicted of robbery,
abduction, rape and the. capital murders of the Kellers.' The jury recom-
mended a death sentence after finding the presence of both aggravating
factors, vileness and future dangerousness.' The Supreme Court of Virginia
affirmed the convictions and death sentence.7 Williams filed a habeas corpus
petition in the Supreme Court of Virginia, but the court dismissed the
petition!8
On November 20, 1996, Williams filed a habeas corpus petition in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia." Williams
asserted the following four claims: (1) the Commonwealth failed to disclose
a second, informal plea agreement with Cruse that provided for a life
sentence recommendation for Cruse in exchange for his testimony against
Williams; (2) the Commonwealth, in violation of Brady v. Maryland,° failed
to disclose a psychiatric report on Cruse; (3) the trial was tainted by the bias
of a juror who had not been forthcoming about her relationships with the
Commonwealth's lead witness and one of the prosecutors in the case; and
(4) the attorney for the Commonwealth had committed misconduct in
failing to advise the court of the juror's omissions.1 The district court
granted a hearing on the issues of the undisclosed agreement, juror bias, and
prosecutorial misconduct. 2 Before the scheduled hearing the Common-
wealth petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
for an emergency stay and a writ of mandamus and prohibition." The
Fourth Circuit granted the emergency stay and remanded the case for the






10. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
11. Williams, 120 S.Ct. at 1485-86; see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)
(requiring prosecutors to provide, upon request, material evidence favorable to the accused).
12. Williams, 120 S.Ct. at 1486.
13. Id.
14. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. S 2254(e)(2) (1996). The statute mandates that:
(2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court
proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless
the applicant shows that -
(A) tie claim relies on -
(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral
review by the Supreme Court that was previously unavailable; or
(i) a factial predicate that could not have been previously discovered throu-
gli the exercise of due diligence; and
(B) the facts underlying the caim would be sufficient to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder
would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.
28 U.S.C. S 2254(e)(2) (1996).
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remand, the district court ruled that Williams's petition did not satisfy the
standards set forth in 28 U.S.C. S 2254(e)(2), and dismissed the petition.'"
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Williams's
petition." The court held that Williams was not diligent in his efforts to
develop his claims in state court, and thus had "failed to develop" the factual
bases of the claims involving juror bias, prosecutorial misconduct, and the
alleged Brady violation." The Fourth Circuit found that Williams could not
meet the specifications found in 28 U.S.C. S 2254(e).(2) for curing his failure
to develop the facts in state court. 8 The Fourth Circuit held that Williams
was barred from receiving an evidentiary hearing.19 The court also rejected,
under 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(1), Williams's claim that the Commonwealth
failed to disclose an informal plea agreement with Cruse.2"
Approximately one hour before Williams's scheduled execution on
October 18, 1999, the United States Supreme Court stayed the execution
and granted certiorari to consider whether Williams was barred by 28
U.S.C. S 2254(e)(2) from receiving an evidentiary hearing on his claims of
a Brady violation, juror bias, and prosecutorial misconduct. 21
II. Holding
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's denial
of Williams's habeas corpus petition in part, and reversed in part.' The
Court held that language in 28 U.S.C. S 2254(e)(2) "failed to develop the
factual basis of a claim" indicates fault, including lack of diligence, on the
part of a petitioner." The Court found that Williams lacked diligence with
respect to his Brady claim regarding the psychiatric report on Cruse.24 The
15. Williams, 120 S.Ct. at 1486.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. S 2254(e)(2).
19. Williams, 120 S.Ct. at 1486.
20. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(1)(1996). The statute mandates that:
(d) An application for a writ of ha~eas corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to y
claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the
adjudication of the claim -
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of dearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States.
28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(1) (1996).
21. Williams, 120 S.Ct. at 1486.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1487.
24. Id. at 1491. The Court found that the report was in existence at the time of
Williams's state habeas petition and could have been discovered with due diligence. Id.
Williams conceded that he could not meet 28 U.S.C. 5 2254(e)(2)'s stringent standard of
showing that, but for the alleged constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder could have
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Court held that Williams was diligent in his efforts to develop his claims of
prosecutorial misconduct and juror bias." The Court remanded the case for
further proceedings regarding those two claims."'
III. Analysis /Application in Virginia
The factual basis for Williams's claims of juror bias and prosecutorial
misconduct involved a juror's and a prosecutor's silence during voir dire in
the face of the trial judge's questions asking whether any juror was related
to any witness, and whether any juror had previously been represented by
any of the lawyers involved in Williams's case." The juror who eventually
became the foreperson remained silent when the question regarding wheth-
er any juror was related to any witness was asked, despite the fact that she
and the Commonwealth's lead witness had been married for seventeen years
and had four children together.2" The same juror also remained silent when
the trial judge asked if anyone had been represented by any attorney in-
volved with the casei despite the fact that one of the prosecutors had repre-
sented her during her divorce from the aforementioned witness.29  The
prosecutor in question also remained silent and failed to alert the court to
the juror's possible sources of bias. 0 Additionally, Williams claimed that
the Commonwealth violated Brady by failing to disclose a psychiatric report
about his accomplice Cruse. 1 The report was written in 1993, before
Williams's trial." In 1995, Williams's attorney wrote a letter requesting that
the Commonwealth disclose psychological reports regarding the Common-
wealth's witnesses." The Commonwealth refused to comply with the
request, and Williams did not make any further attempts to discover such
material.'
The Commonwealth argued that the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA")" barred Williams from obtaining
an evidentiary hearing on claims for which the factual bases were not raised
found him guilty of capital murder. Id. at 1492.
25. Id. at 1492.
26. Id. at 1495.
27. Id. at 1492.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1493.
31. Id. at 1491; see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (requiring prosecutors to
provide, upon request, material evidence favorable to the accused).
32. Williams, 120 S.Ct. at 1491.
33. Id. at 1492.
34. Id.
35. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (1996) (amending 28 U.S.C. Title 153).
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in state court. 6 The Commonwealth urged the Court to adopt a no-fault
interpretation of 28 U.S.C. S 2254(e)(2). 7 Williams argued that AEDPA did
not bar an evidentiary hearing on his claims, because although he exercised
due diligence in preparing his state habeas petition, he did not know the
underlying facts of his claims at the time and therefore could not have
asserted those claims in his state habeas petition." The Court agreed with
Williams's argument that the "failed to develop" language in 28 U.S.C. S
2254(e)(2) requires an element of fault on the part of the petitioner. 9 The
Court found that "[i]n its customary and preferred sense, 'fail' connotes
some omission, fault, or negligence on the part of the person who has failed
to do something" and that Congress intended to use the word "failed" in
such a sense.' The Court explained that diligence means making "a reason-
able attempt, in light of the information available at the time, to investigate
and pursue claims in state court."4
The Court supported its interpretation of the "failed to develop"
language of 28 U.S.C. S 2254(e)(2) by looking to its decision in Keeney v.
Tamayo-Reyes.42 Keeney involved a prisoner's failure to develop the factual
basis of his federal claim; in state habeas proceedings.43 The Court para-
phrased the relevant portion of its holding in Keeney as "prisoners who are
at fault for the deficiency in the state-court record must satisfy a heightened
36. Widliams, 120 S.Ct. at 1486.
37. Id. at 1487.
38. Id. at 1486.
39. Id. at 1488.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1490. The due diligence standard announced in Williams applies to state
habeas corpus counsel's efforts to discover pre-existing Brady violations. Id. This case has no
effect on a prosecutor's obligation- to disclose Brady materials as articulated in Strickler v.
Greene. In that case, the United States Supreme Court stated:
In Brady this court held "that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material to either guilt or to ufiishment, irrespe&ive of the good faith or bad
faith of the prosecution." We have since held that the duty to disclose such
evidence is applicable even though there has been no request by the accused, and
that the duty encompasses ieachrent evidence as weras ex.cul.patory evidence.
Such evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of te proceeig would have
been different." Moreover, the rule encompasses evidence "known only to police
investigators and not to the prosecutor." In order to comply wih Brady, there-
fore, the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence
known to the others acting on the government's behalf in this case, including the•police."
Stricker v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280-81 (1999) (citations omitted).
42. Williams, 120 S.Ct. at 1488-89; see Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 11 (1992)
olding that in order to receive an evidentiary hearing a habeas petitioner must show cause
or his failure to develop properly a claim in state court and actual prejudice resulting
therefrom).
43. Keeney, 504 U.S. at 1.
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standard to obtain an evidentiary hearing."" The Court stated that Con-
gress must have intended to retain the fault element of Keeney's holding in
28 U.S.C. S 2254(e)(2)." s Otherwise, Congress could have changed the
language of the statute to read "did not" instead of using the word "failed."'
Applying the diligence standard to the facts in Williams's case, the
Supreme Court found that "[t]he trial record contains no evidence which
would have put a reasonable attorney on notice that [the )uror's] non-
response was a deliberate omission of material information."' Thus, there
was no reason for Williams to have investigated the juror's public marriage
records. 8 Because Williams did not fail to develop his claims regarding
juror bias and prosecutorial misconduct, he was not required to meet the
strict requirements of 28 U.S.C. S 2254(e)(2) with regard to those claims. 9
The Court found, however, that Williams's efforts to discover the psychiat-
ric report on Cruse were not sufficient to meet its standard of diligence.'
Williams's lack of diligence in developing his Brady claim regarding the
Commonwealth's alleged failure to disclose Cruse's psychiatric report
subjected that claim to the standards of 28 U.S.C. S 2254(e)(2) and the claim
was barred.1
Williams shows that a petitioner will not default a claim for failure to
discover facts when the misconduct or omission of another party prevented
him from discovering those facts or having a reason to investigate or find
those facts. Although the standards set forth in 28 U.S.C. S 2254(e)(2) are
stringent, they will not be ap plied to a petitioner who has exercised due
diligence. The petitioner's effort to develop the factual bases of his claims
is determinative. It is irrelevant whether Williams could have discovered
the facts by exerting the effort to search every public record pertaining to
every single juror. It is sufficient that Williams exercised due diligence in
developing the claims that were available to him at the time of his state
habeas corpus petition. Claims based on factual information that was
unavailable to a petitioner through no fault of his own will not be barred
so long as the petitioner has not neglected his duties to develop evidence in
state court.
Melissa A. Ray
44. Widliams, 120 S.Ct. at 1489 (citing Keeney, 504 U.S. at 11).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1488.
47. Id. at 1493.
48. Id. at 1494. In fact, Williams sought to investigate jury improprieties but the
Supreme Court of Virginia denied his motion for a court-funded investigator because of the
vagueness of the request. Id. at 1493.
49. Id. at 1494.
50. Id. at 1491-92.
51. Id. at 1492.
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